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IN DETERMINING AUDIT DEMAND 
Abstract 
Most prior research into audit fees has been based on a theoretical model which treats audit fees 
as the by-product of a production function (Simunic,  1980) hereby ignoring potential demand 
forces that may drive the level of the audit fee.  In such a production-oriented view of auditing, 
alternative  control  mechanisms  (such  as  internal  auditing  and  corporate  governance)  are 
hypothesized to be substitutes for external auditing, and hence more of  one control mechanism is 
expected to be negatively associated with the level of  external auditing, and hence the audit fee. 
In this paper we examine the impact of risks and controls in the determination of audit 
fees.  Inspired by prior 'anomalous' results, we take a different perspective by focusing on some 
omitted demand factors that may affect the level of the audit fee.  Based on Hay and Knechel 
(2004),  we  argue  that  when  multiple  stakeholders  are  included  in  the  analysis  a  positive 
association between various risk management / control mechanisms and external audit demand is 
a very likely outcome, which is attributable to sharing of control costs between stakeholders and 
positive control externalities amongst stakeholders. 
U sing data collected from a sample of listed companies in Belgium, we  consider both 
disclosures about risk and risk management and actual decisions about corporate governance to 
examine whether audit fees are higher when hypothesized demand forces exist.  Consistent with 
our expectations, our results indicate that audit fees  are higher when a company has an audit 
committee,  discloses  a  relatively  high  level  of financial  risk  management,  and  has  a  larger 
proportion of independent Board Members.  Audit fees  are lower when a company discloses a 
relatively high level of compliance risk management. The latter result indicates that controls are 
only complementary as  long as they are voluntary, as  mandated controls act as  substitutes for 
non-mandated controls. 
2 THE ROLE OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE 
IN DETERMINING AUDIT DEMAND 
An extensive body of  literature has developed related to the level and nature of  audit fees 
in organizations.  The original seminal work by Simunic (1980) spawned an expanding body of 
literature that has examined a large number of  possible drivers of  audit fees. 1  Numerous general 
conclusions can be drawn from this literature, e.g., audit fees are influenced by factors related to 
the size of  the organization (total assets), complexity (subsidiaries or foreign operations), 
inherent risk (receivables and inventory), and litigation risk (levels of  debt, leverage).  Other 
research has identified a number of  factors where the effect on audit fees is either inconsistent or 
counter to expectations.  For example, research linking internal auditing to external auditing has 
resulted in some studies observing a positive association (Anderson and Zeghal, 1994) and others 
showing a negative association (Wallace, 1984).  Still other research has indicated that audit fees 
are positively related to the quality of  corporate governance (Carcello et al 2002; O'Sullivan, 
2000; Hay and Knechel, 2004), which runs counter to intuition since good corporate governance 
would improve the control environment of  an organization and could be expected to lead to 
lower audit fees. 
One possible explanation for these anomalies and inconsistencies is that most research 
into audit fees has been based on a theoretical model which treats audit fees as the by-product of 
a production function (Simunic, 1980).  To justify use of  a production view of  the audit, some 
strong assumptions are needed, e.g., (1) the market for audit services is competitive and (2) the 
level of  assurance delivered is constant within a firm, implying that audit fees are a function of 
cost.  Hay, Knechel and Wong (2004) argue that these assumptions may not be robust to the 
actual market for audit services and the anomalies and inconsistencies may be due to omitted 
I See Hay, Knechel and Wong (2004) for an overview of  the literature on audit fees. 
3 demand factors and the endogeneity of  decisions about alternative controls.  If  the market for 
audit services is not generally competitive or levels of  assurance vary across engagements, 
differential demand forces can lead to variations in audit fees that are not production related. 
To illustrate, consider the link between corporate governance and auditing.  In a 
production view, good corporate governance-such as the existence of  independent Board 
members-should improve the control environment and reduce the need for external aUditing, 
leading to a reduction in audit fees.  However, Hay and Knechel (2004) argue that a demand 
effect may lead to the opposite result: independent directors may demand more auditing in order 
to fulfill their responsibilities and protect their own reputations against questionable financial 
reporting decisions made by management.  Specifically, Hay and Knechel (2004) argue that the 
demand for auditing is a function of  the set of  risks faced by individual stakeholders in an 
organization (management, shareholders, creditors, etc.) and the set of  control mechanisms 
available for mitigating those risks.  Because individual decisions about control processes and 
procedures may shift benefits and costs across groups of  stakeholders, the net investment in 
auditing may increase when multiple stakeholders become involved in corporate governance 
decisions. 
In this paper, we examine the role of  risks and controls in the determination of  audit fees. 
U sing data collected from a sample of  companies in Belgium, we consider both disclosures about 
risk and risk management and actual decisions about corporate governance to examine whether 
audit fees are higher when hypothesized demand forces exist.  Consistent with our expectations, 
our results indicate that audit fees are higher when a company has an audit committee, discloses 
a relatively high level of  financial risk management, and has a larger proportion of  independent 
Board Members.  Audit fees are lower when a company discloses a relatively high level of 
4 compliance risk management.  The remainder of  the paper is organized as follows: In the first 
section we describe a theoretical framework for analyzing the demand for audit services.  In the 
second section, we discuss prior research and specify our hypotheses.  The third section 
describes our research methodology, the variables used in the study and the source of  the date. 
This section is followed by a presentation of  our results.  The final section summarizes our 
results, presents some conclusions and explains the limitations of  the paper. 
Theoretical Framework for the Demand for Audit Services 
The demand for external assurance services, including a financial statement audit, is 
presumed to be dependent on the interaction of  (1) the set of  risks affecting the individual 
stakeholders of  an organization and (2) the set of  control mechanisms that are available to reduce 
the effect of  those risks, which will also vary across stakeholders.  For empirical purposes, we 
assume that the demand for auditing is manifested by the audit fee (F), which can be 
decomposed into (1) a quantity effect (i.e., hours worked during the audit, or q) and (2) a price 
effect (i.e., fee charged per hour of  work, or p).  We also assume that there are multiple 
stakeholders that can endogenously influence the demand for controls affecting an organization, 
including the audit.  Each stakeholder (or group of  similar stakeholders) has a set of  objectives, 
some of  which will be unique and some that will be shared with other stakeholders.  Each 
stakeholder is assumed to confront their own set of  risks and can influence a narrow set of 
controls which is smaller than the entire set of  controls available to the organization as a whole. 
Since an external audit has extensive externalities that may benefit management, investors, 
employees, creditors and regulators, it may be a desirable element of  the control portfolio for 
many stakeholders. 
5 The agency literature suggests that some control mechanisms may be substitutable so that 
there could be a trade-off among various sources of  control available to individual stakeholders, 
including external assurance (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).  The decision problem for an 
individual stakeholder is to minimize the total cost of  managing the risks related to their personal 
interest in the organization.  This view of  control choice implies that the decisions of  individual 
stakeholders within the system create an endogenous demand for controls, including external 
assurance.  However, this decision process will be affected by a number of  possible constraints, 
e.g., external imposition of  some control mechanisms due to regulation.  Individual stakeholders 
will select a level of  control that they can influence based on the net benefit to themselves. 
These control decisions determine the overall level of  control achieved and may reflect either the 
marginal addition of  a specific type of  control (e.g., establishing an internal audit function) or the 
scope of  a control (e.g., the amount and types of  testing performed by the internal auditor).  The 
nature of  control choices maps to the overall level of  control for a single stakeholder as 
illustrated in Figure 1.  The optimal selection of  an individual's level of  control occurs at the 
point where the marginal costs of  losses equals the marginal cost of  adding more controls.  Thus, 
for a single stakeholder, the solution implies the trade-off of  controls and may, or may not, 
include external assurance above the minimum level required by exogenous regulation. 
«<  Insert Figure I about here  »> 
The choice of  control level is complicated due to the iterative sequence of  decisions made 
by multiple stakeholders that would condition specific decisions about external assurance.  For 
example, the residual equity shareholders first select internal management (or assign that task to 
themselves).  Then, internal management selects and implements internal control processes. 
Finally, external stakeholders make decisions about governance and external assurance 
6 conditional on the previous decisions and pre-existing external restrictions (e.g., regulation or 
contractual provisions).  To reflect this complexity, we add the following observations about the 
aggregate demand for external assurance: 
•  Heterogeneity of  goals: Each stakeholder has an individual objective function, and 
related set of  risks, that is unique from other stakeholders.  This reflects the nature of 
multiple (potentially competing) stakeholders. 
•  Span of  control: No single stakeholder dominates the selection of  the control 
portfolio, that is, different stakeholders can make different decisions about the control 
mechanisms they can influence.2 
•  Externality of  control benefits: The stakeholder who selects a control mechanism may 
share the benefits with other stakeholders who are independent of  the decision. 
•  Shared control costs: The stakeholder who selects a control mechanism may not bear 
the full cost of  that control, i.e., the cost of  some controls may be born by 
stakeholders who cannot substantively affect the decision.  In the extreme, 
implementation of  a control may be detrimental to some stakeholders. 
•  Conditionality of decisions: Each stakeholder's decisions are conditional on those 
made by all other stakeholders. 
U sing the financial statement audit as an example, we see a general manifestation of 
these observations by considering just three sets of  stakeholders: management, investors and 
creditors.  First, the agency literature has highlighted the potentially conflicting objectives (or 
risk profiles) of  management and shareholders as well as shareholders and creditors.  Second, 
management selects and hires the external auditor subject to approval of  the shareholders 
(represented by the Board of  Directors) but creditors may have little say in that decision. 
However, creditors are able to impose other restrictions (i.e., covenants) to address their own 
risks.  The selection ofthese control mechanisms may not be beneficial to shareholders, and 
could be detrimental by limiting the choice space of other stakeholders.  Third, all parties 
2 For example, only creditors would be in a position to demand debt covenants and restrictions on future debt 
financing but would probably not be in a position to influence decisions about internal control processes or internal 
auditing. 
7 presumably benefit to some extent from the conduct of  a financial statement audit.  Fourth, 
management generally negotiates the cost of  the audit and receives a significant benefit due to 
the reduction of agency costs, but other stakeholders share the cost?  Finally, both investors and 
creditors make decisions to protect their own immediate interests conditional on the conduct of 
the audit. 
The multiple stakeholder view of  the control choice has a significant impact on the 
decisions made by each stakeholder and creates the possibility that there is a complementary 
association among controls when demand is aggregated across stakeholders, even if  individual 
decisions are based on a trade-off (substitution) of  controls.  Although a full dynamic solution of 
the decision problem is beyond the scope of  this paper,4 Figure 2 illustrates how the dynamics of 
demand might develop.  First, consider the curve shift labeled Q).  Due to cost sharing, the curve 
representing the costs of  controls would shift downwards to reflect the part of  the cost of  each 
control that would be passed to other stakeholders (each level of  control costs less).  The 
resulting optimum would reflect a net increase in the level of  control selected by an individual 
stakeholder, and an overall increased investment in controls for the entire organization.s 
A stakeholder will also take into account decisions made by other stakeholders with 
differing risk profiles.  Now, consider the curve shifts labeled (?).  Decisions made by other 
stakeholders would have the impact of  shifting the loss function down due to the externality of 
benefits received by an individual stakeholder given the level of  control implemented by others. 
3 In a frictionless contracting arrangement, the cost of  the controls may be born entirely by the management as a cost 
of  their signaling behavior.  Whether or not such an environment exists in reality is subject to debate but the 
arguments put forth in this paper are based on the assumption that such contracting situations include frictions that 
keep all signaling costs from accruing to the signaling party (management). 
4 Solution of  the decision problem would most appropriately reflect the implicit game among the individual 
stakeholders. 
5 The selection of  the level of  control may also create benefits for other stakeholders not directly implementing the 
control(s).  However, we assume that the benefits accruing to other stakeholders are of  the nature of  a public good 
and do not reduce the benefit of  risk reduction to the initiating stakeholder. 
8 Also, decisions by others would cause an upward shift in each stakeholder's cost curve due to the 
sharing of  costs of  controls selected by others.  The net effect would be to partially or completely 
offset the initial shift in the cost curve (CD)  The resulting optimum could be either higher or 
lower than the optimum for the case with no externalities.  In Figure 2, we have illustrated the 
outcome in which the final control portfolio (level of  control) is higher than the individual choice 
situation.  In general, if  the first order (direct) effect of  a selected control level exceeds the 
offsetting second order (indirect) effects of  benefits and costs inherited as a result of  decisions by 
others, then the new optimum would be to the right of  the individual optimum, resulting in a net 
increase in demand for control and assurance by the stakeholder.  When demand for control is 
endogenous and then aggregated across stakeholders, there can be a net increase in the total 
demand for external assurance. 
«<  Insert Figure 2 about here  »> 
The hypotheses about the sources of  control developed in the following sections are 
based on implications derived from the above analysis and prior research.  Prior research has 
generally argued that there should be a trade-off of sources of  control (i.e., more of one leads to 
less of  another), implying that alternative sources of  control may have a negative relationship 
with external assurance.  This viewpoint is implicitly based on a single decision-maker scenario. 
In contrast, the analysis in this paper suggests there may be a complementary relationship among 
many controls due to the multiple stakeholders in the process and the externalities of  costs and 
benefits of  their individual decisions.  Such an effect would be manifested as an increase in 
either audit effort (q), audit prices (P), or both. 
9 Prior Research and Hypotheses: 
Consistent with the arguments in the previous section and results reported in Hay and 
Knechel (2004) we hypothesize that audit fees are significantly influenced by risk, internal 
control and governance. 
The argument that the level of  risks affects audit fees is well-established in the research 
literature.  Inherent risk, usually as measured by inventory and receivables, has uniformly been 
found to be positively associated with audit fees (Newton and Ashton, 1989; Stice, 1991). 
Furthermore, proxies for auditor litigation risk have also been shown to be associated with audit 
fees, including measures of  financial health or leverage (Gist, 1994), profitability (Simunic, 
1980), and form of  ownership, especially whether a company is publicly traded or not 
(Hackenbrack and Knechel, 1997).  Stakeholders are interested in controlling the risks that are 
most significant to their own objectives given their relationship to the company.  Consequently, 
consistent with prior research, we specify our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between the level of  risk confronting the 
stakeholders of  a company and the audit fee. 
To further refine Hypothesis  1,  consider the effect of more external assurance on audit costs. 
Since the audit fee is equal to p x q, the demand for more assurance that results in a higher audit 
fee may be due to an increased effort level by the auditor (q) and/or changing the labor mix of 
the audit team so as to utilize more experienced personnel on the engagement (p ). 
Internal Control and Governance 
The demand for auditing is also expected to be influenced by the portfolio of  control 
mechanisms available to mitigate risk.  The agency literature suggests that some control 
10 mechanisms may be substitutable so that there could be a trade-off among various sources of 
control available to individual stakeholders, including external assurance (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  However, what is substitutable for a single stakeholder may be complementary when 
considered across stakeholder groups.  The conduct of  an audit is likely to benefit all 
stakeholders associated with an organization that are interested in increased credibility in 
financial reporting, whether or not they participated in the selection of  the auditor (Eilifsen et. 
al.,2001). 
The effect of  internal control on audit fees is not clear from previous research since 
early research that examined the impact of  internal control and internal auditing on external 
audit fees produced mixed results.  Studies of  internal auditing have found positive 
(Anderson and Zeghal, 1994; Walker and Casterella, 2000), negative (Wallace, 1984), or 
no (Gist, 1995; Johnson et. aI., 1995) association with audit fees.  The few studies that 
have been able to examine internal measures of  internal control have generally found no 
relationship between the quality of  internal control and auditor effort (O'Keefe et.  al., 
1994; Hackenbrack and Knechel, 1997; Mock and Wright, 1999).  However, the theoretical 
model presented in this paper suggests that when the demand for controls is endogenous, 
the relationship between audit fees and controls should be positive, leading to our second 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between the level of  internal control 
in an organization and its audit fee. 
Prior research (Hackenbrack and Knechel, 1997; Blokdijk et.  al., 2004) has shown that increased 
levels of  internal control are generally associated with more audit effort by the lower ranks of  the 
audit team.  This suggests that the audit consumes more effort from lower priced professionals 
11 when internal control is good.  Consequently, we expect that that the increase in fees will be due 
to an increase in q. 
An exception to Hypothesis 2 occurs when the imposition of specific controls is 
exogenous to the system.  An example of  this may occur when internal controls are externally 
(exogenously) mandated by a regulatory authority.  Since mandated controls do not arise from an 
endogenous demand for control, the imposition of  such controls may serve as a constraint on 
stakeholder decisions across all individuals.  In such a case, the relationship between mandated 
controls and audit fees can be negative as stakeholders balance the external requirement against 
the endogenous demand for other forms of  control.  Hay and Knechel (2004) argue that a 
company that is subject to regulation, thus one that may be more sensitive to compliance risk, 
will have lower audit fees because the organization must maintain highly reliable internal 
processes so as to comply with regulatory mandates.  This effect is reflected in Hypothesis 2A: 
Hypothesis 2A: There is a negative association between the level of  mandated 
internal control in an organization and its audit fee. 
Since stakeholders are likely to demand less assurance from auditors when mandated controls are 
in place, it is likely that the reduced audit fee is due to a reduced level of  auditor effort (q).  6 
Numerous studies have reported a positive relationship between the quality of  corporate 
governance and audit fees (Collier and Gregory, 1996; O'Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et aI., 2002; 
Abbott et aI., 2003; Hay and Knechel, 2004).7  The fact that fees are often higher can not be 
explained within a production orientation since there is no obvious explanation why an auditor 
6 To illustrate the potential impact of  mandated controls consider the case of a pharmaceutical company.  National 
regulations usually are quite detailed and complex regarding the design and control of  manufacturing processes to 
assure quality and safety.  These controls also have the effect of establishing rigorous control over inventory which 
reduces many risks associated with the recording and processing of inventory, thus reducing the need for other 
forms of  control such as external assurance.  A similar phenomenon is evident in the audits of  banks where 
information technology is quite advanced in order to assure proper handling of  multitudes of  transactions (Pearson 
and Trompeter, 1994). 
7 One exception to this patter is a paper by Goddard and Masters (2000) who found no association between 
formation of  an audit committee and audit fees. 
12 should bear more risk or perform more testing when the control environment is otherwise 
considered to be effective.  However, the empirical results are consistent with increased demand 
for external aUditing aggregated across multiple stakeholders.  For example, a Board member 
may be generally concerned about the financial performance and reporting of  the organization as 
directed by current management (i.e., investment and/or information risk), but that Director will 
also be concerned about his or her personal exposure if  management commits fraud or some 
other scandal erupts related to the organization.  Consequently, a Director may be interested in 
extended audit testing in order to minimize the risk of such scandals that may affect his or her 
personal reputation (i.e., reputation risk).9  The resulting investment in external aUditing may 
exceed that necessary to simply reduce information risk to an acceptable level for other 
stakeholders.  Furthermore, the cost of  the audit is most likely to be born by the equity 
shareholders who may have little say in determining the extent of  audit work undertaken 
(Carcello et a!.,  2002).  This observation leads to our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive association between the level of  corporate 
governance in place for an organization and its audit fee. ID 
Again, increased demand for assurance will increase audit fees since the auditor may respond by 
increasing the effort level (q) or the labor mix of  the audit team so as to utilize more experienced 
personnel (q). 
9 For example, see Fama (1980) and Eichenseher and Shields (1985). 
10 Note that governance structures may be mandated (e.g., audit committees) but we do not specify a counter 
hypothesis to H3 for mandated governance because such rules generally have the effect of increasing or partitioning 
the active stakeholders in the system (e.g., adding an audit committee), thus increasing the number of sources of 
overall demand for audit assurance.  The difference between internal control and governance in this regard is based 
on the observation that process/control participants are generally not in a position to demand more audit assurance, 
something that Board and Audit Committee members can do. 
13 Research Method, Data and Definition of Variables 
Our approach for analyzing audit fees is based on OLS regression consistent with 
previous research.  For all the analyses reported in this paper, the dependent variable is the 
natural log of  audit fees, i.e., LNFEES.  The independent variables used in this paper are 
summarized in Table 1 and explained below. 
««< Insert Table 1 about here  »»> 
Measures of  Risk and Internal Responses to Risk 
Previous research has identified a number of  risk proxies that are associated with audit 
fees.  Hayet. al.  (2004) identify over 20 different metrics that could be used as financial proxies 
for risk, but the two most common and frequently significant are measures of  inherent risk and 
profitability.  Consequently, we include the following standard proxies in our analysis to control 
for the level of  risk within an organization: 
NETINC  Level of  net income. 
RECTA  Ratio of  accounts receivable to total assets. 
Prior research has often measured profitability as the return on assets or with a dummy variable 
to indicate a loss.  Neither of  these metrics were significant in our model, nor did they 
outperform the explanatory power of  net income alone. 11 
In addition to the typical risk proxies, we also use a number of  risk and risk management 
measures that are available for the companies in our data set that are specific to a defined set of 
risks, and which reflect the organization's own assessment of  risk and risk management efforts. 
11  We also considered risk variables measuring (l) the ratio of  inventory to total assets and (2) the ratio of  debt to 
total assets.  These variables were not significant in any of  our analyses and have been deleted from the model to 
preserve degrees of  freedom. 
14 Such risk measures may be more accurately calibrated to underlying conditions than the 
measures that have been used in previous fee research because they reflect company-specific risk 
information.  The risk measures pertain to 6 specific areas of  risk that are common to virtually all 
organizations: financial, compliance, environmental, technology, internal process and change 
management risks (e.g., see Knechel, 200}).  Specifically, we use risk management disclosures 







A score from} to 5, scaled by the maximum value in the sample, 
reflecting the extent of  disclosures about management ofjinancial risk. 
A score from} to 5, scaled by the maximum value in the sample, 
reflecting the extent of  disclosures about management of  compliance risk. 
A score from} to 5, scaled by the maximum value in the sample, 
reflecting the extent of  disclosures about management of  environmental 
and safety risk. 
A score from} to 5, scaled by the maximum value in the sample, 
reflecting the extent of  disclosures about management of technology risk. 
A score from} to 5, scaled by the maximum value in the sample, 
reflecting the extent of disclosures about management of  internal process 
risk. 
A score from} to 5, scaled by the maximum value in the sample, 
reflecting the extent of  disclosures about management of  change 
management risk. 
The risk management scores were computed by scoring each company's disclosures 
about risk and risk management on a five point scale.  For each company, the annual report was 
evaluated for information about specific types of  risk and related risk management practices.  For 
any given company, a score of  five is assigned if  the company disclosed all of  the following 
items of  information regarding a specific area of  risk: 
•  A general qualitative discussion of  the specific type of  risk and related risk 
management practices. 
•  Current period quantitative risk and risk management information. 
15 •  Prior period quantitative risk and risk management information. 
•  Future period quantitative risk and risk management information. 
•  Quantitative benchmarks for the specific type of  risk and related risk management 
practices. 
A point is subtracted for each category that is missing for a specific company.  We assume that 
the more sensitive a company is to a specific type of  risk, the more extensive and informative its 
disclosures will be related to that risk and its risk management activities.  This sensitivity reflects 
the joint effect of  the existence of  the risk and the company's desire to invest resources to 
mitigate the specific type of  risk.  Given the potential sharing of  costs and benefits of specific 
control processes, we expect that the disclosure of  risk and risk management indicates that the 
organization is very sensitive to the need to identify and manage those specific stakeholder risks, 
regardless of  who is making decisions about specific controls.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we 
expect to find a positive relationship between audit fees and RlSKl, RISK4, RISKS and RISK6. 
Since RlSK2 and RISK3 reflect the impact of  external regulation, we expect them to have a 
significant negative relationship with audit fees, consistent with Hypothesis 2A. 
Two other measures of  the quality of  internal control were extracted from the financial 
reports of  the company: 
IA  Dummy variable =  1 if  the company has an internal audit department, zero 
otherwise. 
RISKMAN  Dummy variable =  1 if  the company uses formal models of  risk 
management as part of  internal control, zero otherwise. 
In line with Hypothesis 2, we also expect to find a positive relationship between these two 
measures of internal control and the level of  audit fees paid by an organization. 
16 Governance Variables 
A number of  typical measures of  the quality of  corporate governance and internal control 
were included in the model for audit fees.  Numerous measures of  the quality of  corporate 
governance have been suggested and examined in previous research (Carcello et ai., 2002; Klein, 
2001).  Consistent with this previous research we examine the following measures of  the quality 









Dummy variable =  1 if  audit firm is a Big 5 firm, zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable = 1 if  the company has an audit committee, zero 
otherwise. 
Number of  non-executive members of  the Board of  Directors. 
Percentage of  the Board of  Directors that are considered to be non-
executive directors. 
Number of  independent members of  the Board of  Directors.12 
Percentage of  the Board of  Directors that are considered to be 
independent. 
Total number of  members on the Board of  Directors. 
Dummy =  1 if  the CEO is also the Chairperson of  the Board of  Directors, 
zero otherwise. 
Based on Hypothesis 3, we expect that there will be a positive relationship between the various 
measures of  the quality of corporate governance and the fees paid to the external auditor. 
Other Control Variables 
Other control variables were included in the model of  audit fees based on the results of 
prior research, including the following: 
12 In the Belgian context, independent directors are directors that are independent from both management and the 
majority shareholders (blockholders). Non-executive directors are director that do not hold an executive position in 
the company. Hence, non-executive directors could well be non-independent from the majority shareholders. 
17 LNASSET 
SUB 
Natural log of  total assets. 
Number of subsidiaries controlled by the company subject to audit. 
We also considered including a dummy variable indicating the existence of  MAS services 
provided by the audit firm.  This variable was not significant in any of  our analyses and has been 
dropped from the results reported in the paper. 
Data 
The population we start from consists of  all Belgian companies that meet both of  the 
following criteria: a) being listed on the Brussels Stock exchange in the year 2001, and b) 
belonging to one of  the following industries: manufacturing, technology, retail, distribution and 
media.13  Thus, we deliberately exclude companies from the financial industry, as well as energy 
and holding companies.  Companies in these omitted sectors have very different businesses and 
balance sheets, and are often much more regulated; so they are likely to behave differently from 
industrials and non-financial service companies.  This restriction reduces our population from 
153 to 64 companies. 
Since audit fee information is not publicly available in Belgium, we contacted each 
company in our sample of  industrials and non-financial service companies and asked to disclose 
the total fee paid for the statutory audit of  the 2001  accounts. We also inquired about information 
regarding corporate governance practices within the firm. A copy of  the questions included in 
this survey is provided in Appendix 1. Out of  64 companies that were contacted, 50 provided the 
required information.  We then hand-collected our risk and risk management data from the 2001 
annual reports of  the 50 remaining fee-disclosing companies in our sample by completing the 
13 Note that 153 companies were listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange in 2001. 
18 risk disclosure grid attached in Appendix 2.  Note that the financial statement data needed to 
measure the control variables in our fee model were collected from the Belfirst database. 
Estimation Models 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate three models using OLS regression in order to 
examine the separate effects of  risk management and governance on audit fees.  We also 
examine their joint effect in the third model. 
Modell: 
LNFEE =  f (Risk Response Variables, LNASSET, SUB, NETINC, RECTA) 
Model Type 2: 
LNFEE = f (Governance Variables, LNASSET, SUB, NETINC, RECTA) 
Model Type 3: 




Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables examined in this paper.  The range 
of  companies in the sample is quite broad.  Company size varies from a minimum of 13.05 
million Euros to a maximum of 12,085.82 million Euros, with a mean of 1,289.17 Euros.  The 
average company possesses 33 subsidiaries.  Additionally, the average audit fee for the 
companies in the sample is €368,049, with a minimum of€7,987 and a maximum of€4,675,756. 
19 Of  most interest to this study are the risk and governance variables.  We include two 
standard risk measures in our analysis: Receivables (RECTA) average about 25% of  total assets 
with a range of 1.42% to 63.87%, while net income (NETINC) ranges from negative €288,000 to 
€698,000, with an average of  €28,845.  The risk disclosure scores reveal a large variance in the 
information about risk and risk management reported in company financial statements. 
Standardized scores for risk range from a high of .294 for compliance risk, followed by .275 for 
internal process risk, to a low of .0347 for technology risk and .088 for change management risk. 
These scores indicate that the companies in the sample disclose approximately 29% of  the 
maximum amount of  information about compliance risk but only 3.5% of  the maximum amount 
of  information about technology risk.  Of  interest is the fact that the disclosure of  financial risk, 
arguably the area of  most concern to the auditor, has a standardized disclosure score of .114. 
The governance variables also indicate a large variance across organizations.  77.4% of 
the companies utilize a Big 5 auditor and 58.0% have an internal audit department, but only 
5.0% of  the companies use formal models of  risk management for developing internal control. 
Almost 75% of  the companies have an audit committee and 30.8% have a CEO who is also 
chairman of  the Board.  The average Board has 9.29 Directors in total, 6.96 non-executive 
directors (comprising 73.4% of  the average Board), and 3.61 independent directors (comprising 
39.2% of  the Board).  The correlation results for all variables in the study are reported in Table 3. 
Variance inflation factors indicate that there are no concerns about multi-collinearity among the 
variables in the study. 
««< Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here  »»> 
20 Regression Results 
The regression results are reported in Table 4.  We report the results of  three separate 
models: 
•  Model 1: Regression model using only the independent variables that reflect risk 
(plus control variables). 
•  Model 2:  Regression model using only the independent variables that reflect 
governance (plus control variables). 
•  Model 3: Regression model with both the risk and governance variables. 
Given that there are a large number of  independent variables considered in the study relative to 
the number of  observations that are available, we only report the coefficients for the independent 
variables that are significant.  Variables that were determined to be insignificant were not 
included in the final model. 
««< Insert Table 4 about here  »»> 
F  or Model 1, we see that four risk variables are significant.  RECTA and NETINC are 
positive and significant, consistent with our expectations in Hypothesis 1.  RISK1 is positive and 
significant consistent with Hypothesis 2.  RISK2 is significant but negative, which is consistent 
with Hypothesis 2A.  RISK3, RISK4, RISK5 and RISK6 are not significant.  The three risk 
variables that are significant and positive support our hypotheses that the greater the sensitivity 
to risk, the higher the audit fee will be since stakeholders will demand more from the company's 
external auditor.  RISK2 reflects sensitivity to compliance risk and suggests a constraint on 
decisions that affect audit fees. 
Model 2 reports the regression results including only governance variables.  We observe 
that AUDCOM and NONEXECP are significant, and both are positive consistent with 
Hypothesis 2.  This suggests that companies that have audit committees and a higher proportion 
21 of  non-executive Directors have, on average, higher audit fees.  The other governance variables 
do not have significant coefficients, most notably BIGS, INDEP, and CEOCHR.  Of  most 
interest, however, is the observation that none of  the governance variables have negative 
coefficients, again providing evidence that improved governance does not affect the production 
of  the audit through a reduction of  control or inherent risk, which would then be associated with 
lower audit fees. 
Finally, in Model 3, we include both the risk and the governance variables.  These results 
are perfectly consistent with Models land 2.  For the risk and risk response variables, RECTA, 
NETINC, RISKl are still positive and significant, while RISK2 is negative and significant. 
Again, two governance variables are significant-AUDCOM and NONEXECP-and both are 
positive.  The results for model 3 suggest that the overall results are stable in spite of  the 
relatively small sample size.  In general, the results support all four hypotheses, indicating that 
audit fees are a function of  two demand drivers: (1) risk and (2) demand for control by 
stakeholders.  There is little or no evidence that audit fees are more accurately modeled using a 
production perspective, especially in light of  the significant positive coefficients for the 
governance variables.  These results support the overall conclusions put forth originally in Hay 
and Knechel (2004). 
Supplementary Analysis 
We also constructed and tested two (aggregate) risk management indices, as well as an 
aggregate governance index. First, we define ICRM as the internal control and risk management 
index that aggregates the score for voluntary internal control and risk management devices. 
ICRM is scored on a six point scale, and computed by allocating one point for each 'non-
22 mandated' (or voluntary) risk management measure (that is, RISK!, RISK2, RJSK5, RJSK6, 
RISKMAN and IA) that had a non-zero score. Second, we define MANDIC as the aggregate 
mandated internal control index. This index is scored on a two point scale by summing the 
values for RISK3 (compliance risk management) and RISK4 (environmental and health and 
safety risk management) . Third, we define an aggregate governance index, GOV, which is 
scored on a five point scale; one point was allocated ifBIG5 equals one, AUDCOM equals one, 
CEOCHAIR equals one, INDEP% larger than 50% and NONEXO/O larger than 50%. 
We tested all three models using the aggregate indices instead of  individual risk 
management and/or governance scores. Estimating Modell including both risk indices, ICRM 
and MANDIC, yields a non-significant result for ICRM. This clearly indicates that only financial 
risk management is significantly associated with audit demand. The result on MANDIC is 
consistent with the results reported in Table 4, with a significant negative coefficient (p = ???). 
Estimating Model 2 including the governance index yields very similar results to what is 
reported in Table 4, with a very significant and positive coefficient on GOV (p=0.0028). Finally, 
estimating Model 3 by including both risk management indices and the governance index, yields 
an insignificant ICRM coefficient, a negative significant MANDIC coefficient (p = 0.0323) and 
a positive significant GOV coefficient (p = 0.0008).  Again, these results are generally consistent 
with Table 4, but indicate that only financial risk management is positively associated with 
external audit demand. 
Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the impact of risks and controls in the determination of audit 
fees.  Based on a  demand-oriented view on auditing, we hypothesize that there is  a  positive 
23 association between internal control/risk management in an organization and its audit fee,  and 
also  between  corporate  governance  and  audit  fee.  We  argue  that  such  a  complementary 
association is likely in a multiple stakeholder framework where sharing of  control costs between 
stakeholders and positive control externalities amongst stakeholders lead to increased voluntary 
demand for levels of control. We further argue that external auditing and internal controls are 
substitutes,  however,  in  case  of mandated internal  controls,  as  the  latter increase  the  overall 
control cost. 
Consistent with our expectations, we find for a sample of Belgian listed companies that 
audit fees are higher when a company has an audit committee, discloses a relatively high level of 
financial risk management, and has a larger proportion of independent Board Members.  Audit 
fees are lower when a company discloses a relatively high level of  compliance risk management. 
The latter result is however consistent with our hypothesis that the association between internal 
control and audit fees  is negative if internal controls are mandated. In the latter case mandated 
controls act as substitutes for non-mandated controls. 
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* Note that "level of  control" refers to the mapping of  specific control selections and 
related scope of  control coverage to a single measure that is monotonically increasing 
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Controls TABLE 1 
Definition of Variables 
Variable  Definition  Expected Si~n 
Panel A: Risk Variables 
NETINC  Net income 
RECTA  Ratio of  receivables to total assets  + 
RISK}  A score from} to 5, scaled by the maximum value  + 
in the sample, reflecting the extent of  disclosures 
about financial risk and risk management. 
RISK2  A score from} to 5, scaled by the maximum value  -
in the sample, reflecting the extent of  disclosures 
about compliance risk and risk management. 
RISK3  A score from} to 5, scaled by the maximum value in  -
the sample, reflecting the extent of  disclosures about 
environmental and safety risk and risk management. 
RISK4  A score from} to 5, scaled by the maximum value  + 
in the sample, reflecting the extent of  disclosures 
about technology risk and risk management. 
RISK5  A score from} to 5, scaled by the maximum value  + 
in the sample, reflecting the extent of  disclosures 
about internal process risk and risk management. 
RISK6  A score from} to 5, scaled by the maximum value  + 
in the sample, reflecting the extent of  disclosures 
about change management risk and risk 
management. 
IA  Dummy variable = } if  the company has an internal  + 
audit department, zero otherwise. 
RISKMAN  Dummy variable = } if  the company uses formal  + 
models of  risk management as part of  internal 
control, zero otherwise. 
Panel B:Governance Variables 
, 
...  .........  ........  ..... 
BIG5  Dummy variable = } if  audit firm is a Big 5 firm,  + 
zero otherwise. 
AUDCOM  Dummy variable = I if  the company has an audit  + 
committee, zero otherwise. 
NONEX  Number of  non-executive members of  the Board of  + 
Directors. 
NONEX%  Percentage of  the Board of Directors that are  + 
considered to be non-executive directors. 
INDEP  Number of  independent members of  the Board of  + 
Directors. 
INDEP%  Percentage of  the Board of  Directors that are  + 
considered to be independent. 
BODNR  Total number of  members on the Board of  Directors.  + 
29 CEOCHR  I Dummy = 1 if  the CEO is also the Chailllerson of 
I 
+ 
the Board of  Directors, zero otherwise. 
Panel C: Control Variables 
LNASSET  I Natural log of  total assets  I  + 
SUB  I Number of subsidiaries controlled by the company  I  + 
30 TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable (N=50)  Mean  Std Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent Variable 
FEE (in Euros)  368,049  836,984  7,987  4,675,756 
LNFEE  11.85  1.25  8.99  15.36 
Control Variables: 
ASSET (OOO's Euros)  1,289,166  2,787,402  13,053  12,085,816 
LNASSET  12.65  1.69  9.48  16.31 
SUB  33.06  26.50  1.00  95 
Risk Variables: 
NETINC (OOO's Euros)  28,845  125,349  -288,000  698,000 
RECTA  0.253  0.137  0.014  0.639 
RISK1  0.114  0.197  0  1 
RISK2  0.294  0.460  0  1 
RISK3  0.133  0.232  0 
RISK4  0.035  0.148  0  1 
RISK5  0.275  0.451  0  1 
RISK6  0.088  0.217  0  1 
IA  0.580  0.499  0  1 
RISKMAN  0.118  0.325  0  1 
Governance Variables 
BIG5  0.774  0.423  0  1 
AUDCOM  0.745  0.440  0  1 
NONEX  6.960  3.404  0  17 
NONEX%  0.734  0.194  0  1 
INDEP  3.610  2.060  0  12 
INDEP%  0.392  0.171  0  0.875 
BODNR  9.290  3.196  4  19 
CEOCHR  0.308  0.466  0  1 
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
31 TABLE 3 
Correlations Among the Variables Used in the Analysis 
LNASSET  SUB  NETINC  RECTA  RISK1  RISK2  TRISK  RISKMAN  IA 
LNASSET  1.888  8.688***  8.467***  -8.231  8.528***  8.251*  8.39899***  8.366***  8.438*** 
SUB  8.688***  1 .888  8.858  8.817  8.254*  -8.832  8.12867  8.888  8.365** 
NETINC  8.467***  8.858  1 .888  -8. 195  8.551***  8.338**  8.48186***  8.585***  8.158 
RECTA  -8.231  8.817  -8.195  1 .888  -8.845  -8.248*  -8.89464  -8.889  -8.889 
RISK1  8.528**  8.254*  8.551***  -8.845  1.888  8.241*  8.46784***  8.473***  8.393*** 
RISK2  8.251*  -8.832  8.338**  -8.248*  8.241*  1 .888  8.79956***  8.164  8.891 
TRISK  8.398***  8.128  8.481***  -8.894  8.467***  8.799***  1.88888  8.365***  8.243* 
RISKMAN  8.366***  8.888  8.585***  -8.889  8.473***  8.164  8.36529***  1 .888  8.197 
IA  8.438***  8.365**  8.158  -8.889  8.393***  8.891  8.24367*  8.197  1 .888 
AUDCOM  8.187  8.249*  8.182  8.829  8.218  8.864  8.18866  -8.861  8.327** 
CEOCHAIR  -8.167  -8.884  -8.182  8.198  -8.155  8.855  8.88837  -8.182  -8.861 
INDEP  8.472***  8.351**  8.365***  8.853  8.512***  8.254*  8.37551***  8.338**  8.285** 
INDEPP  8.164  8.125  8.132  8.214  0.174  8.133  0.22256  0.243*  8.169 
NON EXEC  8.686***  8.314*  8.394***  -8.179  8.446***  8.161  8.24236*  8.192  8.458*** 
NONEXECP  8.483***  8.217  8.247*  -8.881  8.158  8.883  8.13227  8.147  8.391*** 
BIG5  8.382**  8.386**  8.899  8.254*  8.256*  8.129  8.24483*  8.843  8.232 
LNBODNR  8.514***  8.328**  8.314**  -8.259*  8.453***  8.157  8.21488  8.182  8.311*** 
TGOV  8.539***  8.364**  8.298**  8.886  8.483***  8.158  8.38199**  8.482**  8.718*** 
32 AUDCOM  CEOCHAIR  INDEP  INDEPP  NON EXEC  NONEXECP  BIG5  LNBODNR  TGOV 
LNASSET  8.187  -8.167  8.472**  8.164  8.686***  8.483***  8.382**  8.514***  8.539*** 
SUB  8.249*  -8.884  8.351**  8.125  8.314**  0.217  8.386**  8.328**  8.364** 
NETINC  8.182  -8.182  8.365***  8.132  8.394***  8.247*  8.899  8.314**  8.298** 
RECTA  8.829  8.198  8.853  8.214  -8.179  -8.881  8.254  -8.259  8.886 
RECTA  8.83  8.188  8.711  8.134  8.218  8.994  8.871*  8.868*  8.963 
NRISK3  8.218  -8.155  8.512***  8.174  8.446***  8.158  8.256*  8.453***  8.483 
NRISK4  8.864  8.855  8.254*  8.133  8.161  8.883  8.129  0.157  0.158 
TNRISK  8.188  8.888  8.375***  8.222  8.242*  8.132  8.244  8.214  0.381 
DRISK1  -8.861  -8.182  8.338**  8.243*  8.192  8.147  8.843**  8.182  8.482 
IA  8.327**  -8.861  8.285**  8.169  8.458***  8.391***  8.232  8.311**  8.718*** 
AUDCOM  1.888  -8. 186  0.262*  8.179  8.317**  8.218  8.248*  8.285**  0.564*** 
CEOCHAIR  -8.186  1 .888  -8.835  8.118  -8.238*  -8.165  8.839  -8. 195  -8.457*** 
INDEP  8.262*  -8.835  1.888  8.818***  8.467***  8.273*  8.283  8.482***  8.513*** 
INDEPP  8.179  8.118  8.818***  1.888  8.865  8.232  8.129  8.815  8.352** 
NON EXEC  8.317* *  -8.238*  8.467***  8.865  1.888  8.647***  8.222  8.818***  8.592*** 
NONEXECP  8.218  -8.165  8.273*  8.232  8.647  1.888  8.167  8.145  8.569*** 
BIG5  8.248*  8.839  8.283  8.129  8.222  8.167  1 .888  8.135  8.436*** 
LNBODNR  8.285**  -8. 195  8.482***  8.815  8.818***  8.145  8.135  1 .888  8.378*** 
TGOV  8.564***  -8.457***  8.513***  8.352**  8.592***  8.569***  8.436***  8.378***  1 .888 
33 TABLE 4 
OLS Regression Results 
Predicted  Modell  Model 2  Model 3 
sIgn  (N =  49)  (N = 48)  (N =  47) 
Intercept  6.642  4.706  5.368 
«0.001)  (0.001)  «0.001) 
Control Variables 
LNASSET  +  0.333  0.406  0.344 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
SUB  +  0.014  0.010  0.011 
(0.010)  (0.081 )  (0.041) 
Risk Variables 
NETINC  +  0.00000284  0.00000235  0.00000226 
(0.007)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
RECTA  +  1.82233  1.74174  1.53725 
(0.022)  (0.018)  (0.026) 
RISK1  +  1.654  1.439 
(0.031)  (0.038) 
RISK2  -0.516  -0.467 
(0.029)  (0.025) 
Governance Variables 
AUDCOM  +  0.552  0.493 
(0.0176)  (0.0238) 
NONEXP  +  1.092  1.322 
(0.0994)  (0.0364) 
F-value  21.95  25.28  24.14 
«0.001)  «0.001)  «0.001) 
Adj.  R-square  72.37%  75.61%  80.10% 
Notes: See Table 1 for variable definitions.  p-values indicated with parentheses 
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